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The economic and social viability of  
Tanzanian Wildlife Management Areas  
Introduction
This policy brief contributes to assessing the economic and 
social viability of Tanzania’s Wildlife Management Areas 
(WMAs) through preliminary findings by the ‘Poverty and 
ecosystem Impacts of Tanzania’s Wildlife Management 
Areas’ (PIMA) project, focusing on benefits, costs, and their 
distribution between State, community and household. 
WMAs constitute Tanzania’s national community-based nat-
ural resource management programme for wildlife, where-
by groups of villages set aside land for wildlife conservation 
and tourism. Nineteen WMAs currently operate; a planned 
38 in all will total 7% of Tanzania’s surface area. The central 
objectives of the WMA policy are to “increase participation 
of local communities in management of wildlife resources; 
enable local communities to derive benefits from wildlife 
resources; and enhance conservation of wildlife resources” 
(WWF, 2014). 
This note addresses WMAs’ economic and social viability 
from local communities’ perspective. WMAs promise secure 
land tenure, revenue and regulated access to/ use of key 
natural resources. In some cases, WMAs partially deliver 
these ends. However, most WMAs currently earn little 
tourism revenue while imposing considerable costs on local 
people. Many WMAs have generated land-based conflicts 
(state vs communities; WMAs vs tourist operators; tourist 
operators vs communities; between and within communi-
ties). WMA administration costs match or exceed partici-
pating villages’ revenues, and focus mostly on enforcement 
while failing to mitigate wildlife damage or deliver meaning-
ful benefits. 
Benefits
Direct income: The collection of revenues earned by indi-
vidual WMAs, and their distribution among state, WMA 
and villages, are governed by State regulations (URT, 2012) 
(Fig1, Box1). For Enduimet and Burunge, two of the Tanza-
nian WMAs with the greatest tourism appeal (WWF, 2014), 
revenues accruing to villages work out at USD 0.6 and USD 
3.5 per capita/year (Box 1), but most WMAs have negligible 
Village game scouts, Burunge WMA. Photo Alex Wunsch
  
 
• Be established following processes of consultation and planning that follow the spirit of Free, Prior and Informed Consent. 
• Allow villages to revisit the terms of agreement, including changing the management plan. 
• Allow for access to key resources within the WMA in ways that support both local livelihoods and environmental sustainability, 
through access to dry season grazing in northern Tanzania, and to forest products and land for non-permanent cultivation in south-
ern Tanzania. 
• Build on benefit distribution and taxation formulae favouring villages over the State, and on co-funding for  community-wide bene-
fits as opposed to anti-poaching and patrolling measures.
Policy Recommendations 
To be economically and socially viable, WMAs must 
tourism revenue or none at all. These very low per capita 
revenues are invested in community development (e.g. edu-
cation, infrastructure).
Indirect economic benefits: WMAs protect rangelands 
against fragmentation, conversion to cultivation, and 
against loss of mobility crucial to migratory wildlife and 
livestock (Galvin et al., 2008), translating into direct eco-
nomic benefits through livestock production and tourism 
attractions (enhanced landscape; wildlife numbers). WMAs 
also attract donor money supporting conservation and 
development activities, valuable contributions, but high-
lighting WMAs’ dependence on philanthropy and their lack 
of financial sustainability.
Costs
Opportunity costs: Much production is lost through restrict-
ed access to key resources. In the northern WMAs, people’s 
main source of income is from grazing mobile livestock 
herds on rangelands. Vastly under-rated in official statistics, 
pastoral livestock production rivals national agricultural 
GDP from crops (Behnke and Muthami, 2011), alongside 
providing resilient local livelihoods. Together, livestock, crop 
and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) sustain house-
In 2012/13, Enduimet WMA received ~USD 129,000 as its share 
of revenues following State and district government taxation, 
which topslices roughly one-third of game viewing and half of 
hunting income (URT, 2012; WWF, 2014). Enduimet WMA finan-
cial reports from that year account for expenditures amounting to 
~ USD 108,241 and roughly three-quarters of this financed WMA 
administration conservation  costs, including village game scouts, 
while one-quarter was distributed to the 9 member villages 
(equivalent to ~ USD 0.6/capita/year). 
Burunge earned ~USD 248,500 in 2013/14 after government tax-
ation, and distributed half of its total expenditure to its member 
villages (~ USD 3.5/capita/year). 
WMA member villages in principle receive equal shares of the 
revenue distributed to them. However, this equal sharing is 
problematic. Different villages contribute different areas of land 
to the WMA; each village has its own characteristics – some have 
considerable farmland, few wildlife or wildlife habitat, contrib-
ute little land and experience little wildlife damage, while others 
have little or no farmland, more wildlife habitat, contribute more 
land and suffer more wildlife damage. Thus, in a context of very 
unequal opportunity and direct costs of WMAs, equal benefit 
sharing results in net inequality and in some villages being seen as 
free-riding on the efforts of others.
Enduimet CBO distributes WMA scholarships directly to students, 
while in Burunge, individual village governments decide how to 
spend WMA revenues on education (building classrooms, issuing 
scholarships). Where infrastructure investments appear to benefit 
the whole community, individual-level benefits, such as meeting 
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allowances, medical or educational bursaries, and job opportu-
nities, benefit only a small subset of village residents, often AA 
members or VGS and their families.
Additional donations from NGOs, such as WWF, AWF, Honey-
guide Foundation, Alat, Fisong, contribute funds to the WMAs, 
usually earmarked for administration, anti-poaching, conservation 
and crop protection, alongside USAID’s cash for work. These re-
stricted funds amounted to USD 92,100 (85% of Enduimet’s own 
revenues) and USD 50,400 (20% of Burunge’s own revenues) in 
Enduimet (2012-3) and Burunge (2013-4), respectively.
BOX1
Distribution of WMA income and benefits: Enduimet and Burunge WMA
Compiled from official CBO reports, using USD/TSH end-of-fiscal-year 
exchange rates.
hold incomes averaging up to a couple of thousand USD/
year (Homewood et al., 2009, 2012). In Enduimet, 90% of 
village lands were initially set aside for the WMA, represent-
ing major opportunity costs. Following considerable conflict 
and negotiation, Enduimet WMA now sets aside 60% of 
total village lands; cattle have conditional grazing access. 
In other WMAs like Burunge, rising human and livestock 
populations (due to migration, not least people displaced 
from rangelands elsewhere) alongside exclusion of livestock, 
increase pressure to use WMA lands set aside through a 
hasty process ten years back (Bluwstein et al., in review; 
Igoe and Croucher, 2007). Some WMA villages have lost 
substantial income from and good investor relations with 
pre-WMA direct deals (e.g. Sinya in Enduimet). Investors 
struggle to deal with multiple payments at different levels 
(e.g. Shumata in Enduimet); with multiple villages now at 
loggerheads, and often disgruntled villagers. 
Set-up and Administration costs: WMAs receive planning 
and implementation support from donor-funded projects 
and conservation NGOs. Once established, considerable 
running costs focus especially on enforcement (game scout 
salaries, vehicles, communications, weapons), generally sub-
sidised by external donors. In principle, village game scouts 
(VGS) help villagers facing wildlife damage to people, crops 
and livestock. In practice VGS focus mainly on anti-poach-
ing; wildlife damage (including human deaths, crop and 
livestock losses) is neither appropriately investigated nor 
compensated. WMA income nominally for community 
development in fact supports anti-poaching informant net-
works. And while WMA enforce ment against poaching and 
livestock grazing receives support from NGOs and appears 
effective, entrepreneurs defaulting on WMA contracts or 
payments appear to avoid sanctions (eg Shumata in En-
duimet) (Homewood, in press).
Social and political costs translate into barriers to  
economic viability:
There is widespread confusion over WMA and village 
boundaries (Bluwstein and Lund, in preparation), under-
mining mobility, coping strategies, and production systems 
crucial to people’s economic welfare. GIS shapefiles held by 
different government agencies and NGOs do not agree ei-
ther among themselves or with villages’ participatory maps, 
generating conflict.  
Poor process and lack of transparency in WMA implemen-
tation mean local people do not realize the full implications 
of the WMA for production and livelihoods (Kangalawe and 
Noe, 2012; Moyo et al., in review).  
Local people’s sense of powerlessness in the WMA pro-
cess, fear and anger following mis-targeted anti-poaching 
campaigns (IPS, 2014), and inability to have grievances ad-
dressed, undermine support for and legitimacy of WMAs, 
and often trigger costly legal conflicts or violent confronta-
tions (Loliondo, Enduimet, Burunge, Randileni) (Homewood, 
in press; Bluwstein et al., in review; Loveless, 2014; BBC, 
2013; Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012).
Conclusion
We argue that the process of consultation, planning and 
implementation needs to be re-thought with respect to 
local conditions in each individual case. State and WMAs 
need to give communities more power to 
negotiate. Communities should be able not only to revisit 
terms of agreement, but to withdraw from WMAs that are 
unworkable and/or impose unacceptable costs.
Tenure and access have been poorly managed in many 
WMAs in Tanzania to date. Provided northern WMAs 
guarantee both protection of communal tenure against en-
croachment (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012; BBC, 2013) 
and dry season access (successfully contested in Enduimet 
WMA), hitherto sceptical and resistant populations (eg 
Burunge) could be won over. Southern WMAs should priori-
tise securing access to farmland and agricultural inputs, as 
compensation for farmland lost to WMAs.
Grossly skewed distribution formulae for benefit sharing 
and taxation need radical revision in favour of communities. 
Local economic viability could be strengthened through 
better state co-funding for WMA-derived community initia-
tives (eg. salaries for health or education personnel staffing 
WMA revenue-funded facilities). 
WMAs prioritize rule enforcement without addressing social 
and political underpinnings of people’s behaviour, target-
ing petty offenders, trespassers and bushmeat hunters 
through anti-poaching activities that further alienate local 
communities, while failing to address central corruption 
and big players. For many, WMAs lack legitimacy and invite 
trespass. WMAs should prioritise protecting people’s assets 
from rising human-wildlife conflict. 
To sum up, social and economic viability in WMAs depends 
on:  
1. genuinely participatory planning and local support, 
revised benefit sharing and taxation formulae, security 
of tenure and drought grazing access in the pastoral 
north, sustained access and tenure to sufficient agricul-
tural land and forests in southern and western WMAs 
2. proven tourism potential through interest and earn-
ings (currently completely lacking in the Selous-Niassa 
Corridor WMAs; highly uncertain in northern WMAs 
e.g. Makame) 
3. revenue to and distribution within local communities 
proven to compensate for opportunity costs  
4. If these criteria are not met, we strongly advise not to 
push for WMA establishment
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Livestock grazing in WMA in northern Tanzania. Photo Jens Friis Lund 
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